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Abstract 
Cognitively oriented psychologists often define behavioral effects in terms of mental 
constructs (e.g., classical conditioning as a change in behavior that is due to the formation of 
associations in memory) and thus effectively treat those effects as proxies for mental 
constructs. This practice can, however, hamper scientific progress. I argue that if 
psychologists would consistently define behavioral effects only in terms of the causal impact 
of elements in the environment (e.g., classical conditioning as a change in behavior that is 
due to the pairing of stimuli), they would de facto adopt a functional approach that not only 
reveals the environmental causes of behavior but also optimizes cognitive research. The 
cognitive approach in turn strengthens the functional approach by facilitating the discovery 
of new causal relations between the environment and behavior. I thus propose a functional-
cognitive framework for research in psychology that capitalizes on the mutually supportive 
nature of the functional and cognitive approaches in psychology. 
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Why the cognitive approach in psychology would profit from a functional approach  
and vice versa 
The cognitive approach in psychology has dominated psychological research for 
almost half of a century now. Cognitively oriented researchers aim to understand the nature 
of the mental processes and mental representations by which organisms store, process, and 
retrieve information and that are assumed to guide behavior (e.g., Neiser, 1967). Despite 
many remarkable successes (see Lamberts & Goldstone, 2004, for reviews), the cognitive 
approach also has limitations. Most importantly, many mental constructs cannot be observed 
directly. Researchers often try to overcome this problem by using directly observable 
behavior as a proxy for mental constructs. In the first part of this paper, I argue that the use of 
proxies can hamper research and theorizing. Next, I put forward a functional-cognitive 
framework in which the cognitive approach is strengthened by combining it with a functional 
approach aimed at revealing the environmental causes of behavior. Then, I consider potential 
arguments against combining the functional and cognitive approaches. Finally, I list a 
number of recommendations for psychological research 
Limitations of the Cognitive Approach in Psychology 
Using behavioral effects as proxies for mental constructs 
 Mental constructs refer to a realm outside of the physical world in which information 
is represented and processed independently of the physical system in which it is implemented 
(e.g., the brain, a computer; see Brysbaert & Rastle, 2009; Gardner, 1987). Many mental 
processes and representations cannot be observed directly but can only be inferred from how 
a system (e.g., a human, a computer) responds to certain situations. For instance, whereas the 
mental representation of a chair cannot be observed directly, one can infer from how 
someone reacts to a chair (e.g., sits on it) whether that person possesses certain information 
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about chairs.  
The fact that many mental representations and mental processes cannot be observed 
directly of course complicates the study of those constructs. One way to circumvent these 
problems is to use behavioral effects (i.e., patterns of behaviors in certain situations) as 
proxies for mental constructs. These effects are assumed to function as a substitute for the 
mental constructs in that their presence can be treated as equivalent to the presence of the 
mental constructs themselves. Therefore, the effects can be defined in terms of mental 
constructs and the conditions under which they occur provide a direct reflection of the 
properties of the mental constructs. For example, cognitive learning researchers who study 
the mental process of association formation in memory (see Bouton, 2007, for a review) often 
use the presence of classical conditioning effects as a proxy for the formation of associations 
in memory. Whenever classical conditioning is observed (e.g., a dog starts salivating to a 
tone after that tone has been paired with food), they conclude that association formation has 
taken place. Likewise, researchers have used negative priming effects (i.e., the observation 
that responses to a stimulus are slowed down when the stimulus is preceded by a related 
stimulus) as a proxy for the mental process of the inhibition of mental representations (e.g., 
Joormann, 2004; Tipper, 1985).  
Problems with using behavioral effects as proxies of mental constructs 
Unfortunately, using behavioral effects as a proxy for mental constructs is 
problematic in several respects. These problems arise from the fact that it implies a priori 
assumptions about the relation between mental constructs and behavior. As such, using 
behavioral effects as a proxy for mental constructs violates the general scientific principle 
that the explanandum (that which needs to be explained; in this case behavioral effects) needs 
to be kept separate from the explanans (that which is used to explain; in this case mental 
                                          A Functional-Cognitive Framework 
 
5
constructs; Hempel, 1970).  For a behavioral effect to be a proxy of a mental construct, it 
does not suffice that the effect can be explained on the basis of the mental construct (e.g., that 
association formation can produce classical conditioning or that the inhibition of 
representations can result in negative priming). In order to make the reverse inference from 
the presence of the effect to the presence of the mental construct, the mental construct needs 
to be a necessary condition for the effect (i.e., the effect can be present only if the mental 
construct is present). If it turns out that the behavioral effect can be caused by other mental 
constructs in the absence of the to-be-registered mental construct, then the presence of the 
behavioral effect does not allow one to draw firm conclusions about the to-be-registered 
mental construct (also see Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2004; Poldrack, 2006). 
For instance, the negative priming effect has been largely abandoned as a proxy for inhibition 
because it has been argued that the effect can be caused by mental processes other than 
inhibition (e.g., Neill & Valdes, 1992). Similarly, evidence supporting the idea that 
conditioning effects are not necessarily due to the formation of associations in memory (e.g., 
Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009) raises doubts about whether the presence of 
conditioning effects demonstrates the presence of association formation.  
One could nevertheless continue to use behavioral effects as proxies for mental 
constructs as long as there are no reasons to doubt the usefulness of those proxies. When 
doubts are raised about existing behavioral proxies, one can simply switch to new behavioral 
proxies that are still undisputed. There are, however, at least two problems with such an 
approach. First, it can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy. Merely entertaining the idea that a 
mental construct is a necessary cause of a behavioral effect, could encourage researchers to 
ignore evidence that questions this idea. As such, it could slow down the development of 
theories about alternative causes of the behavioral effect. For instance, it is possible that 
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conditioning researchers paid relatively little attention to conditioning via instructions 
because this effect does not fit well with the idea of the gradual formation of associations in 
memory as the result of the repeated pairing of stimuli. It is only with the advent of 
alternative mental construct theories that conditioning via instructions became a viable 
research topic (e.g., De Houwer, 2009).  
Second, when theoretical ideas about the causes of a behavioral proxy do change, this 
can have disastrous consequences for theories about the mental construct that the proxy was 
assumed to capture (e.g., association formation, inhibition of representations). When a 
behavioral effect is treated as a proxy of a mental construct, each instantiation of the 
behavioral effect by definition becomes a source of information about the mental construct. 
This implies that theoretical ideas about the mental causes of a behavioral effect (i.e., that the 
effect cannot be caused by other mental constructs) determine on an a priori basis which 
findings are considered to be relevant for the development of theories about that mental 
construct (i.e., all instances of a behavioral effect). A change in ideas about the causes of a 
behavioral effect would fundamentally alter the set of findings that are deemed to be relevant 
for theories about a mental construct. Findings that were previously considered to be relevant 
(i.e., instances of the old behavioral proxy) are no longer relevant whereas findings that were 
previously considered to be irrelevant are now relevant (i.e., instances of the new behavioral 
proxy). Such a change would invalidate existing theories and call for new empirical work 
with new behavioral proxies. For instance, theories about inhibition that were constructed on 
the basis negative priming data are inaccurate if those data were the result of mental 
processes other than inhibition. Likewise, if conditioning effects are not necessarily due to 
the formation of associations in memory, then many existing theories of association 
formation might have been based on the observation of conditioning effects that were 
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actually produced by other mental processes. Hence, these theories would need to be 
abandoned and new theories would need to be formulated on the basis of new behavioral 
proxies. Because one cannot foresee future developments in theories about the relation 
between mental constructs and behavioral effects, there is always the risk that researchers are 
using the wrong proxies, even when being mindful of the underlying assumptions. 
Is the use of proxies actually problematic for the cognitive approach?  
One could still argue that in actual scientific practice, the use of behavioral effects as 
proxies for mental constructs is not that problematic. In this section, I will discuss three 
arguments that could lead to this conclusion. First, not all mental constructs are 
unobservable. For instance, conscious thoughts and feelings are directly observable, be it 
only by the individual who possesses those thoughts and feelings (e.g., Hayes, 1995; Skinner, 
1957). Likewise, identity theorists have put forward the idea that some mental states actually 
correspond to (physical) neural states and are thus directly observable in principle (e.g., 
Place, 1956). It is indeed true that the use of proxies becomes unnecessary or less 
problematic when the to-be-captured mental constructs can be observed directly. 
Nevertheless, it also seems safe to conclude that many of the mental constructs that are at the 
core of cognitive psychology (e.g., nodes and associations in semantic networks, schemata, 
activation and inhibition of representations, attentional filters, storage and retrieval of 
memory exemplars, short- and long-term memory, working memory, mental models, implicit 
cognition, unconscious inferences and appraisals, goal-activation, motives, attitudes, etc.) 
cannot currently be observed directly because they are assumed to be unconscious and thus 
unavailable to direct observation by the individual or because it is difficult to determine 
whether or how they relate to directly observable neural states. When studying these 
unobservable mental constructs, one should be aware of the risks of using behavioral effects 
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as proxies.  
Second, it could be argued that the use of proxies is unlikely to pose insurmountable 
problems for cognitive psychology because proxies are used successfully in other sciences. 
Physicists, for instance, have introduced many constructs that cannot be observed directly 
(e.g., black holes) and study them by observing other entities that can be observed directly 
(e.g., the effect that black holes have on the trajectory of other stellar objects). These indirect 
observations can also be regarded as proxies in that they are used to draw conclusions about 
an unobservable target based on the direct observation of something other than the target. All 
conclusions that are based on indirect observations depend on a priori assumptions about the 
relation between the target and the directly observed entity. In the case of unobservable 
physical constructs, however, those assumptions are most often grounded in knowledge about 
physical objects that has been verified independently of the unobservable physical construct 
(e.g., that all physical objects exert a gravitational pull on each other). In the case of 
unobservable mental constructs, strong and independent support for a priori assumptions 
underlying proxies is often lacking. This lack of independent evidence substantially increases 
the risk of incorrect conclusions when using proxies to study unobservable mental constructs. 
One could attempt to hedge the risks by using several proxies for each mental construct. 
Although such an approach is clearly preferable to always using the same proxy of a 
particular mental construct, there remains a distinct possibility that behavioral effects are 
never a direct reflection of one particular mental process or mental representation. Moreover, 
because each behavioral effect is likely to reflect a unique set of mental processes, one can 
expect that different proxies of the same construct often tend to diverge, raising the question 
of how to draw conclusions about the mental construct.  
Third, one could argue that there is no fundamental difference between direct and 
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indirect observations (and thus proxies) in that even conclusions that are based on direct 
observations are not necessarily correct. It is undoubtedly true that direct observations can be 
influenced by factors other than the target that is observed (e.g., the genetic make-up of the 
organism, previous experiences with that target, concepts and hypotheses that were formed in 
the past). Avoiding the use of proxies of mental constructs will not result in a completely 
objective study of those constructs. In all likelihood, the aim of complete objectivity can 
never be reached. Nevertheless, different scientific practices do differ in the probability of 
being misleading. Drawing conclusions based on indirect observations such as proxies is 
most often open to more sources of bias than drawing conclusions based on direct 
observations. Indirect observations not only imply the risks involved with direct observations 
(because indirect observations of a target are actually direct observations of something else 
than the target) but also the additional risk of flawed a priori assumptions about the relation 
between the target and that which is directly observed. Cognitive researchers should thus be 
aware of the extra risks of using proxies of mental constructs.  
The Merits of Combining a Functional and Cognitive Approach 
Even if researchers are aware of the problems associated with the use of behavioral 
effects as proxies of mental processes, they might continue this practice because they believe 
that it is the only way to study unobservable mental constructs. The cognitive approach also 
offers few tools and incentives to always conceptualize behavioral effects without referring to 
mental constructs.  In this section, I propose a functional-cognitive framework that offers an 
alternative to the use of proxies for mental constructs in cognitive psychology. Within the 
framework, the cognitive approach is strengthened by grafting it onto a functional approach 
in which behavioral effects are defined in terms of the causal impact of the environment on 
behavior. The functional approach not only optimizes the study of mental constructs, it also 
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has merit on its own by revealing the environmental causes of behavior. In its turn, cognitive 
theories about the mental constructs that mediate behavioral effects can lead to the discovery 
of new functional knowledge. Hence, the functional-cognitive framework highlights the 
mutually supportive nature of functional and cognitive approaches in psychology.  
A cornerstone of the functional approach in psychology is the practice of defining 
behavioral effects exclusively in terms of elements in the environment (for a detailed 
discussion, see Chiesa, 1992, 1994; Hayes, 1995; Hayes & Brownstein, 1986). For instance, 
classical conditioning effects are not changes in behavior that are due to the formation of 
associations in memory but changes in behavior that are due to the pairing of stimuli (see De 
Houwer, 2007, and De Houwer & Barnes-Holmes, 2010, for a detailed discussion). Likewise, 
negative priming is not a slowdown in responding that is due to the inhibition of mental 
representations but a slowdown in responding that is caused by the prior presentation of a 
related stimulus. These definitions of behavioral effects steer clear of any reference to mental 
constructs such as association formation or the inhibition of mental representations, including 
a priori assumptions about the mental causes of the effects (see Table 1). 
Combining the cognitive approach in psychology with a functional approach has at 
least two advantages. First, a functional approach has merit on its own because it provides 
information about the environmental causes of behavior. Establishing the presence of a 
behavioral effect implies the identification of the environmental causes of a change in 
behavior. Note that this goes beyond mere observation in that causal relations cannot be 
observed directly but need to be inferred. Referring to a change in behavior as a behavioral 
effect therefore implies a hypothetical explanation of the behavior that is couched in terms of 
elements in the environment rather than in terms of mental constructs. Although the causal 
impact of elements in the environment on behavior (i.e., behavioral effects) cannot be 
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observed directly, the experimental method provides a solid basis for making causal 
inferences and thus for establishing the presence of behavioral effects. For instance, claiming 
that an increase in the time to respond to a target stimulus is an instance of negative priming 
implies that the increase in response time was caused by the presence of a related prime 
rather than, for instance, a change in the correct response from one trial to the other. 
Likewise, claiming that an increase in salivation when hearing a tone is an instance of 
classical conditioning entails that this change in behavior was caused by the pairing of the 
tone and food. Experiments can provide the evidence that the pairing was the actual cause of 
the change in salivation rather than other factors such as the mere presence of food.  
A functional approach does not only allow one to explain individual behaviors in 
terms of elements in the environment, it can also lead to abstract functional knowledge, that 
is, general knowledge about the environmental determinants of behavior. By studying 
potential moderators of behavioral effects (e.g., the nature of the stimuli that are presented, 
the responses that are observed, the organism that is studied, or the situational context in 
which the effect is observed), more can be learned about the conditions under which certain 
elements in the environment (e.g., stimulus pairings, the presence of prime stimuli) influence 
behavior (e.g., produce an increase in salivation or a slowdown in response time). This can 
lead to functional knowledge that is abstract in the sense that it is assumed to be valid for a 
large variety of situations. For instance, conditioning research revealed that when 
reinforcement of a behavior is stopped, this behavior is more likely to persist when it was 
previously reinforced in an inconsistent manner (i.e., sometimes but not always followed by a 
reward) than when it was previously reinforced in a consistent manner (i.e., always followed 
by a reward; e.g., Bouton, 2007). Likewise, negative priming studies support the conclusion 
that the disruptive impact of a prime on subsequent performance is particularly pronounced 
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for those features of the prime that are related to ongoing tasks (e.g., Tipper, Weaver, & 
Houghton, 1994). Such abstract functional knowledge allows psychologists to predict and 
influence individual behaviors inside and outside of the laboratory (e.g., the degree to which 
behaviors persist after terminating reinforcement or stimuli adversely affect performance).  
 A second advantage of adopting a functional approach is that it can also increase the 
success of cognitive psychology. Whereas the functional approach is concerned mainly with 
the question of when certain elements in the environment influence behavior, the cognitive 
approach addresses the question of how those elements in the environment influence behavior 
(also see Bechtel, 2005). It does so by describing the mental processes and mental 
representations that are assumed to mediate the effect of the environment on behavior. 
Whereas the description of behavioral effects can provide an explanation of behavior in terms 
of elements in the environment, the description of mental constructs can provide an 
explanation of behavioral effects in terms of mental constructs. The functional and cognitive 
approaches thus focus on two separate levels of explanation that have different explanatory 
targets (i.e., explanandum) and employ different explanatory constructs (i.e., explanans; see 
Table 1). Mental explanations are directed at explaining why the environment influences 
behavior in a certain manner (explanandum) by describing the mental processes and 
representations that mediate those effects (explanans). As such, the functional approach 
provides the input on which mental explanations are built. A strong functional approach 
therefore allows for a strong cognitive approach: The more we know about when a behavioral 
effect occurs, the more precise we can be about the mental constructs that mediate this effect. 
The reverse is also true. Mental explanations should not only provide an account for 
existing functional knowledge but should also generate new hypotheses about the conditions 
under which behavioral effects occur. Mental explanations can thus strengthen the functional 
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approach by organizing existing functional knowledge (i.e., their heuristic value) and 
generating new functional knowledge (i.e., their predictive value). For instance, several 
cognitive models of classical conditioning postulate that associations in memory change only 
when and to the extent that there is a prediction error, that is, a discrepancy between the 
stimuli that actually occur and the stimuli that were expected to occur (e.g., Dickinson, 
1980). This idea not only allowed these models to account for a variety of known results 
(e.g., the shape of learning curves, the phenomenon of blocking, see Bouton, 2007) but also 
led to the discovery of the intuitively implausible fact that additional stimulus pairings can 
sometimes reduce the size of classical conditioning (i.e., the phenomenon of overexpectation; 
e.g., Kremer, 1978). In the context of negative priming research, inhibition models not only 
explained the basic negative priming effect but also led to the discovery that negative priming 
is particularly pronounced for those stimulus features that are related to ongoing tasks (e.g., 
Tipper et al., 1994). In sum, the functional and cognitive approaches in psychology are 
mutually supportive. 
Importantly, the interplay between the functional and cognitive approaches works 
best if both are kept conceptually distinct. By defining behavioral effects strictly in non-
mental terms, existing ideas about the mental causes of behavioral effects cannot impose a 
priori constraints on (a) the different mental explanations of behavioral effects that are being 
considered or (b) the type of behavioral effects that are deemed to be relevant for theories 
about a mental construct. The absence of constraints on mental explanations of behavioral 
effects maximizes the opportunity for theoretical innovation and thus for the discovery of 
new functional knowledge. For example, the idea that classical conditioning effects can be 
due not only to association formation but also to the formation and evaluation of propositions 
(e.g., De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009) has led to a number of 
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new discoveries, including the fact that conditioning reflects not only the actual presence of 
stimuli but also verbal instructions, interventions, and prior knowledge (see De Houwer, 
2009, for a review). The absence of a priori constraints on the empirical basis for mental 
theories, on the other hand, allows one to construct mental explanations without basing them 
on (potentially incorrect) a priori assumptions. It also makes it possible to spell out the facts 
that any mental explanation should account for, using terms that do not refer to any specific 
mental explanation. This in turn allows a continuous and stable development of the functional 
level of explanation (i.e., the input for mental explanations) even when mental explanations 
of behavioral effects continue to change.  
Potential Arguments against Combining the Functional and Cognitive Approach  
 In the previous section, I highlighted the potential benefits of a functional-cognitive 
framework that combines the strengths of the functional approach with those of the cognitive 
approach in psychology. It is important to realize that the functional-cognitive framework 
does not in itself imply a choice for one of both approaches as the most important one. Each 
approach is based on fundamentally different philosophical assumptions and aims (for a 
discussion, see Chiesa, 1992, 1994; Gardner, 1987; Hayes, 1995; Hayes & Brownstein,1986). 
Which assumptions and aims one chooses to adopt, determines which approach is regarded as 
most crucial. The main argument of this paper is that, regardless of these assumptions, the 
functional and cognitive approach can be mutually supportive. For cognitive psychologists, 
the functional approach can be an instrument for facilitating the discovery of the mental 
mechanisms that mediate the impact of the environment on behavior. For those who chose to 
focus on the aims of the functional approach, the cognitive approach can be an instrument for 
discovering new functional relations between environment and behavior. Both approaches 
can uphold their fundamentally different philosophical underpinnings and aims while being 
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mutually supportive. Moreover, combining the two approaches highlights the fact that each 
individual study can contribute simultaneously to the aims of both approaches. 
 It is true, however, that the success of the framework depends on what each of the 
approaches can add to the other approach. The respective proponents could have doubts 
about the extent to which other approach can help them achieve their aims. I now address 
those reservations.  
Possible limitations of a functional approach 
 Astute readers might have noticed that the functional approach corresponds to the 
approach that radical behaviorists adopt (e.g., Hayes et al., 2001; Skinner, 1938, 1957). A 
crucial difference between radical behaviorism and the functional-cognitive framework, 
however, is that the former excludes whereas the latter promotes interaction between the 
functional and cognitive approach. Nevertheless, cognitively oriented psychologists might be 
tempted to resist a functional approach for the same reasons that they rejected radical 
behaviorism (see Chiesa, 1992, 1994, for an excellent discussion of the core assumptions and 
critiques of radical behaviorism). Most importantly, cognitive psychologists might argue that 
certain important topics in psychology are beyond an analysis in terms of effects of the 
environment on behavior (e.g., Chomsky, 1959, but see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 
2001). If true, this would potentially limit the importance of the functional approach and 
suggest that sometimes the cognitive and functional approaches should part ways. There are 
two ways to respond to this concern. First, given the benefits that a functional approach can 
have for cognitive psychology, one should do all that is possible to extend the range of the 
functional approach. The fact that many mental constructs such as “associative link” and 
“inhibition” cannot be observed directly is unlikely to change. Moreover, there will always 
be risks when using behavioral effects as proxies for unobservable mental constructs. A 
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functional approach provides the best guarantees for a successful cognitive approach and 
should thus be adopted in combination with the cognitive approach whenever it is possible.  
 Second, one should not underestimate the power of a functional approach. 
Functionally oriented psychologists (e.g., functional contextualists; see Hayes et al., 2001) 
have continued to refine their functional analyses of all kinds of psychological phenomena 
such as learning, speaking, remembering, and problem solving. So-called private events (i.e., 
conscious thoughts and feelings that can be observed directly but only by the person who 
experiences those events) have also been submitted to detailed functional analyses (see 
Hayes, 1995, and Hayes & Brownstein, 1986, for an informative discussion of how private 
events fit within the functional approach). Instead of clinging to the belief that a functional 
approach by definition cannot deal with certain types of phenomena, cognitive psychologists 
would benefit from exploring what has actually been achieved in this respect. Such a 
dialogue between cognitive psychology and functionally oriented psychologists could lead to 
many new conceptual tools for describing in non-mental terms the behavioral effects and the 
conditions under which these effects occur.   
One should also be aware of the fact that neuroscience and behavioral genetics can be 
integrated in a functional approach. For instance, behavioral neuroscientists study the impact 
of elements in the environment on neural responses such as blood flow in the brain as 
measured by fMRI (e.g., Carlson, 2010). Likewise, behavioral neuroscientists and behavioral 
geneticists manipulate neurological and genetic properties of organisms in order to study how 
this moderates the way in which those organisms respond to elements in the environment. All 
of this can be achieved without referring to mental constructs. This does not, however, 
exclude a contribution of neuroscience and genetics to cognitive psychology. On the 
contrary, by contributing to functional knowledge, they impose important constraints on 
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mental explanations and thus help improve and select between different mental explanations.  
 It should be noted that, also in the context of neuroscience and genetics, the functional 
approach needs to be kept conceptually separate from the cognitive approach. This implies 
the view that neural responses (e.g., bloodflow in the amygdala in response to a threatening 
picture) are not treated as proxies of mental constructs (e.g., processing of threat; see 
Poldrack, 2006, for a discussion of the problem of inferences about mental processes on the 
basis of neural data) but simply as effects of elements in the environment on the brain, effects 
that can be explained by describing mental processes. Such conceptual rigor might require 
some effort, but produces important benefits in the long run.  
Potential risks of a cognitive approach 
 Functionally oriented psychologists might also have reasons for resisting a cognitive 
approach. First, they might have doubts about the ontological status of mental constructs and 
thus about the feasibility of the aim to uncover the true mental processes that mediate 
behavioral effects (e.g., Blechtel, 2005; Chiesa, 1994). However, even if one would deny the 
existence of (unobservable) mental constructs or the ability to uncover the mental constructs 
that mediate behavioral effects, cognitive theories can still provide useful tools for furthering 
functional knowledge. The instrumental value of cognitive theories for the functional 
approach is independent of the ontological status of mental constructs. If those constructs do 
correspond to a reality, then cognitive theories that closely approximate this reality are likely 
to be the theories that have the largest heuristic and predictive function. If mental constructs 
are mere heuristic and predictive tools, than those theories that provide the best tools (i.e., 
have the largest heuristic and predictive value) will most likely dominate the cognitive 
approach. Whereas functionally oriented researchers can extend their approach with a 
cognitive approach based on a purely instrumentalist position, cognitively oriented 
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researchers can maintain their realist stance while adopting a functional approach in order to 
help uncover the nature of the mental world. In sum, the merit of the framework that is 
proposed in this paper does not depend on ontological assumptions about mental constructs.  
 Second, functionally oriented researchers might argue that adopting a cognitive 
approach would detract attention away from the aim of understanding the relation between 
environment and behavior (e.g., Chiesa, 1994, pp. 152-153). However, it is important to 
realize that there is no logical reason why a functional approach would be hampered by a 
cognitive approach in this manner. Mach (1893/1960), who provided much of the 
philosophical basis for the functional approach in psychology, acknowledged that theories 
about unobservable mediating processes can have a heuristic and predictive value (see 
Chiesa, 1994). Radical behaviorists who argued against a cognitive approach (e.g., Skinner, 
1937, 1957) did not refute this argument on logical grounds but merely pointed at potential 
practical problems (i.e., difficulties in studying unobservable constructs). Hence, functionally 
oriented psychologists are free to explore the benefits of a cognitive approach and engage in 
a respectful dialogue with cognitive researchers. In sum, once initial preconceptions are set 
aside, there seems to be little to lose and much to gain from combining the functional and 
cognitive approaches.  
Recommendations for Psychological Research 
The abstract arguments that were developed in this paper do result in concrete 
recommendations for psychological research in general (see De Houwer & Barnes-Holmes, 
2010, and De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2010, for a discussion of the 
implications of the functional-cognitive framework in learning research and attitude research, 
respectively). First, behavioral effects and mental constructs need to be separated 
conceptually. This division means that separate terms should be used for behavioral effects 
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(e.g., classical conditioning, negative priming) and mental constructs (e.g., association 
formation, inhibition). The terms that are used to refer to behavioral effects should avoid 
references to mental constructs and vice versa. Second, behavioral effects should be defined 
in terms of the causal impact of specific elements in the (present or past) environment (e.g., 
the pairing of stimuli, the presence of a certain prime) on specific aspects of behavior (e.g., 
salivation, the speed of responding to a target). Third, behavioral effects should not be treated 
as proxies of mental constructs. Negative priming, for instance, is not by definition caused by 
inhibition and therefore not by definition informative about the properties of inhibition. 
Fourth, all empirical findings should first be described, as much as possible, in terms of 
behavioral effects. This recommendation implies that all empirical results should in the first 
instance be explained at a functional level by describing them as effects of certain stimuli in 
the (present or past) environment on behavior that occur under certain conditions and that are 
moderated by certain elements in the environment. These functional explanations should be 
as general and abstract as possible. Fifth, research should be directed both at developing 
mental explanations of behavioral effects (i.e., what are the mental processes and 
representations that mediate these effects) and at improving functional explanations of 
behavior (what are the abstract elements in the environment that cause and moderate 
behavior). This recommendation implies that the merits of research should be assessed not 
only on the basis of the extent to which it advances understanding of mental constructs but 
also on the basis of how much it contributes to the understanding of the environmental causes 
of behavior. Following these guidelines can increase the success of both the cognitive 
approach and the functional approach in psychology and renders these two approaches 
mutually supportive.  
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Table 1. Core aspects of the functional and cognitive approaches to classical conditioning and negative priming. 
 
 
     Conditioning        Negative priming 
   Functional   Cognitive    Functional    Cognitive 
Definition  Change in behavior due to Change in behavior due to  Slowdown in response speed  Slowdown in response speed 
   the pairing of stimuli  the formation of associations  due to presence of prime  due to inhibition  
 
Explanandum  Change in behavior  Conditioning effect   Change in response speed  Negative priming effect 
 
Explanans  The pairing of stimuli  - Association formation  The presence of a prime  - Inhibition 
       - Evaluation of propositions       - Episodic retrieval 
       - etc.          - etc. 
